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PARENTAL GENETIC SHAPING AND PARENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL SHAPING
By Anca Gheaus
Analytic philosophers tend to agree that intentional parental genetic shaping and intentional parental
environmental shaping for the same feature are, normatively, on a par. I challenge this view by
advancing a novel argument, grounded in the value of fair relationships between parents and children:
Parental genetic shaping is morally objectionable because it unjustifiably exacerbates the asymmetry
between parent and child with respect to the voluntariness of their entrance into the parent–child
relationship. Parental genetic shaping is, for this reason, different from and more objectionable than
parental environmental shaping. I introduce a distinction between procreative decisions one makes qua
mere procreator—that is, without the intention to rear the resulting child—and procreative decisions one
makes qua procreator-and-future childrearer. Genetic shaping is objectionable when undertaken in the
latter capacity: Both selection and enhancement are objectionable because they introduce an unnecessary
and avoidable inequality in the parent–child relationship; in the case of enhancement, this also results
in harm to the future child.
Keywords: equality, parents, children, enhancement, selection, shaping.
I. INTRODUCTION
To decide to rear a child, especially if you become a parent by means of
voluntary procreation, is like inviting a stranger about whom you knownothing
to move in with you for two decades or so. You have a choice whether or not
to invite the stranger. Like you, she or he knows nothing about you, yet has
no choice but to accept the invitation—and accept you. This has been always
the case. But in this day and age technology makes it possible to choose some
of the features of those who will be our children, or to choose one’s partner
in procreation based on features they are highly likely to pass on to one’s
offspring.
Of course, parents have always been able to use their prerogative in order
to intentionally shape the minds and bodies of their children after birth. They
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have been doing this by controlling the environmental conditions in which
their children were brought up—call this ‘environmental shaping’; education
is the most obvious instance of parental environmental shaping. Today, par-
ents can achieve a similar end by genetically engineering their yet-unborn
children—call this ‘parental genetic shaping’1 Genetic shaping comes in two
forms: parents can either choose to implant an embryo on the basis of its
genetic characteristics—call this ‘selection’—or they can genetically enhance
an embryo with the help of technology—call this ‘enhancement’. In the fu-
ture, parental genetic shaping might become easily available and the scope of
parental choice with respect to children’s characteristics might widen. Is there
a normative difference between parents exerting influence over their existing
children by means of socialization—including, most obviously, education—
and parents exerting influence over their future children by means of genetic
engineering—whether in the form of selection or in the form of enhancement?
And if the answer is yes, which of the two is more objectionable?
This paper compares intentional environmental shaping and intentional
genetic shaping. Much shaping of both kinds is, of course, non-intentional and
some is unavoidable; one’s choice of partner, for instance, or parents’ feeding
routines, cannot but shape the children.My focus is on shapingwith the specific
intention of instilling particular features in the child. Some philosophers deny
the existence of a normative difference between parental environmental and
parental genetic shaping. Nicholas Agar, in particular, defended a plausible
and influential principle stating that the two are normatively on a par:
if we are permitted to produce certain traits by modifying our children’s environments
then we are also permitted to produce them by modifying their genomes. (Agar 2004:
113)
Agar’s principle is often relied upon in order to explain why parental genetic
shaping is morally permissible and, in some cases, required. But, of course,
the principle can just as well indicate the impermissibility of parental environ-
mental shaping.
Yet, Agar’s principle goes against many peoples’ intuitions. Various nor-
mative bodies and some philosophers have been critical of genetic shaping of
certain features of the future child, but not of environmental—and, in particu-
lar, educational—shaping for similar features. And bodies such as the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority2—a UK regulatory body—and, in
the USA, the Presidents’ Council of Bioethics (2003, 54–5) expressed signifi-
cant moral worries about parental genetic shaping without at the same time
1 In the same category of genetic shaping fall natural ways of attempting to determine genetic
features of one’s future offspring—for instance by way of choosing one’s procreating partner; I
will set these to one side in this paper.
2 See quotation in Harris (2007: 156).
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calling into question the permissibility of (existing and widespread) parental
educational and environmental shaping.
This paper sides with the latter in being critical of Agar’s principle. I do not
aim to provide, in this paper, a comprehensive account of the normative differ-
ences between parental environmental shaping and parental genetic shaping.
Nor can I offer an all things considered assessment of how each practice is ob-
jectionable. Instead, I indicate a reason why the use of (genetic) technology to
shape one’s future child is, in one important respect, more objectionable than
the shaping one’s child through environmental factors such as education. This
amounts to a pro tanto reason to be even more critical of intentional parental
genetic shaping than of intentional environmental shaping.
The paper unfolds as follows: in the next section, I explain the scope of my
enquiry, the nature of the argument—that is, what I take it to be an argument
for—and draw some necessary distinctions. In the subsequent section, I discuss
several likely reasonswhy individualsmay engage in deliberate parental genetic
shaping and how these reasons bear on the normative status of parental action.
Here I also explain the typical philosophical arguments that question the
moral desirability of parental genetic shaping. It is not my purpose to evaluate
the merits of these criticisms of genetic shaping. Rather, I contend that, by
themselves, they do not show that parental genetic shaping is normatively
different from parental environmental shaping. In the last section, I point to a
feature of parental genetic shaping that parental environmental shaping does
not display (or, rather, displays in a normatively different context). With the
help of an analogy, I explain why this feature is morally objectionable.
II. SET-UP
Several up-front clarifications are in order. The first is about the features which
make the object of parental shaping discussed here. The scope of this paper is
restricted to features that are medically unnecessary and morally neutral. By
morally neutral features I mean features that are unlikely to influence whether
or not child lives up to the demands of morality. It is hard to see why one
kind of environmental shaping—education—is at all objectionable when it is
aimed at instilling morally required features (though of course particular ways
in which shaping can take place may be objectionable). Genetic shaping with
respect to such features may also be permissible or even mandatory3 though it
is a matter of debate whether decision concerning such shaping is best left to
parents or to the state (Fowler 2015). Similarly, good parents try to avoid their
children coming to harm, and therefore to prevent and cure disease or other
3 For a recent review of reasons advanced in the debate on moral enhancement, see Specker
et al. (2014).








malfunctioning—for instance with the help of medicine and health education.
By contrast, genetic shaping with respect to medically necessary features is
not beyond criticism (nor is the distinction between medically necessary and
medically unnecessary features crystal clear). Some people believe that parents
are morally permitted to choose an embryo that is likely to develop the same
disability as the parent; others think that it is objectionable to choose an embryo
on the basis of its genetic predisposition to a particular disability, while yet
others think that parents should choose the embryo whose generic make-up
is likely to result in the best possible life for the future child (Savulescu 2001).
But the most divisive issue is over the moral status of the genetic shaping of
morally optional and medically unnecessary features of one’s future children.
Therefore, the scope of the present discussion is restricted to parental shaping
of morally neutral and medically irrelevant attributes such as sex, height,
hair and eye colour, other elements of physical appearances, personality (e.g.
extroversion), abilities (e.g., musical ability) and intelligence.
Second, I rely on the usual distinction between:
a. deeming a behaviour, or attitude, morally objectionable,
b. deeming a behaviour, or attitude, morally impermissible
and
c. the belief that it is permissible to interfere with the agent who displays the
behaviour or attitude.
A behaviour or attitude may be morally objectionable yet permissible because
one may not be in breach of any duty by engaging in it, for instance when one
fails to display certain virtuous behaviours. Also, a behaviour or attitude may
be morally objectionable yet permissible because, although one is in breach
of some duty by engaging in it, one does not thereby violate anybody’s right.
The so-called right to do wrong illustrates this situation.
The focus of my enquiry is on whether parental genetic shaping is morally
objectionable and, if so,more objectionable than parental educational shaping.
The conclusion may or may not determine the question of the moral permis-
sibility of parental genetic shaping, and even less so the question of whether
it is permissible to interfere with parents who engage in genetic shaping. By
the end of the paper, you may agree with my reasons to deem parental genetic
shaping objectionable in a way in which parental educational shaping is not,
yet think that this reason is not enough to make it morally impermissible. This
is because you may deem some morally desirable effects of parental genetic
shaping—for instance, gains in the child’s welfare—sufficiently important to
offset its moral costs.
You may also believe that parental genetic shaping is in fact morally imper-
missible, but on other grounds than the ones I discuss here. Several philosophers
brought arguments against parental embryo selection as well as against en-
hancement of already existing embryos. Against the latter theremay beweighty







PARENTAL GENETIC SHAPING AND PARENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL SHAPING 5
prudential reasons having to do with inherent risks related to available tech-
nologies, which may render enhancements in general morally impermissible
(Buchanan et al. 2000: 191–6). Genetic shaping for medically and morally neu-
tral features may also be morally impermissible because it imposes on children
the parents’ particular conception of the good (Clayton 2006: 104). Finally,
all genetic shaping of features that confer competitive advantage to the future
child may be impermissible on egalitarian grounds (Buchanan et al. 2000: 187–
91; Daniels 2001; Fowler 2015). Below I engage more extensively with the last
two arguments.4
Alternatively, you may get to the end of the paper believing that it is morally
impermissible for parents to engage in genetic shaping for the reason I provide,
yet that it would be wrong for society to interfere with them coercively: For
instance, in cases when such interference would amount to serious violations
of privacy or bodily autonomy.
The third point concerns a less common distinction. I introduce it in or-
der to explain why and when both kinds of genetic shaping—selection and
enhancement—are morally objectionable. I suggest that it is important to
distinguish between actions that one undertakes qua mere procreator and ac-
tions that one undertakes qua procreator-and-future childrearer5. By ‘mere
procreator’ I understand here an individual who does not intend to rear the
child she or he procreates; all they do is to bring a child into existence. By
‘chldrearer’ I understand the person who brings up a child, independently
from her or his procreative relationship with the child. When I refer to indi-
viduals who are both the procreator and the (intended) childrearer of a child, I
speak of ‘parents’. When they decide to engage in genetic shaping, they act qua
procreator-and-(future) childrearer. As I explain below, my account of what
makes genetic shaping objectionable, for which I argue in the last section of this
paper, concerns only actions that an individual undertakes qua parent—that is
qua procreator-and-future childrearer.
Some actions one undertakes quamere procreator, such as embryo selection,
have to be evaluated in light of the non-identity problem; such evaluation is
complicated by the controversial question of whether one can benefit individ-
uals by bringing them into existence: when a procreator chooses an embryo on
the basis of its genetic characteristics, that person thereby decides to bring into
existence a particular individual, rather than the individual that would have
developed from any other, non-implanted, embryo. When it takes the form of
selection, parental genetic shaping is a necessary condition for the existence
4 There are more arguments to the conclusion that selection and enhancement are impermis-
sible but, like the argument from risk, they are not specific to parental selection and enhancement
and, unlike the argument from risk, they are unconvincing.
5 I do not consider, in this paper. the third term of comparison, that is, the moral evaluation
of actions one undertakes qua (future) childrearer when one is not also the procreator of the child
in case.








of that particular future child. Selection then cannot harm the resulting child
unless being brought into existence is itself harmful for her or him—that is,
if her or his life is such that it is not worth living. It is hard to see how an
individual can have a legitimate complaint against an action of their procre-
ator, action which was necessary for their coming into existence, and on the
assumption that they have a life worth living.6 And, in particular, if one thinks
that an individual can be benefited by being brought into existence, it is difficult
to see what that complaint may be.7 Indeed, we sometimes do speak as if being
brought into existence can be a benefit—for instance by suggesting that people
have reason to be grateful to their procreators for their very existence. Some
philosophers believe that this is a sound assumption (Holtug 2001). I assume
that embryo selection undertaken qua mere procreator is not objectionable.
But the procreators I consider in this paper are not mere procreators, that
is, people who do not intend to rear their offspring; they are individuals who
procreate with the intention and expectation that they will rear the child they
brought into existence.8 They do not merely create another human being, but
also a particular social relationship. By contrast, mere procreators do not create
a particular social relationship. The evaluation of the procreative decisions
undertaken qua procreators-and-future childrearers should thereby be more
complex than the evaluation of actions undertaken by mere procreators (for
example, than the actions of individuals who procreate with the intention, and
expectation, that other people will adopt and rear the child the procreator
brings into existence).
Actions undertaken qua procreator-and-future childrearers ought to be eval-
uated not only by reference to the well-being of the child they create but also
in light of the relationship that they create with that child. Thereby, even when
the resulting child cannot have a complaint against genetic shaping under-
taken by her procreator qua mere procreator—as it is the case with embryo
selection by a mere procreator—she and the rest of us can have a complaint
against the procreator qua future childrearer. The complaint is against the
creation and endurance of an objectionable relationship. In this case, the child
6 A complaint, of course, can be generated from within a non-person affecting view of
morality, according to which a state of affair may be morally worse than another state of affairs
even if the first is not worse than the second for any particular individual.
7 But for an account of what it is to harm somebody that is compatible with such a com-
plain, see Shiffrin (1999). On her account, however, it is difficult to see why procreation is ever
permissible. One must assume that it is, for the present enquiry to make sense.
8 There is a debate on the deontic status of bringing into existence children whom one does
not intend to parent. The prevalent view is that all that procreators owe their progeny are lives
worth living; for a plausible expression of this view, see Vallentyne (2002). Yet, some philosophers
follow O’Neill (2003), as well as common morality, in the belief that parents owe their children
a lot more than lives worth living. Here I do not take a position on this debate; but I think that
a distinction between the duties of individuals qua mere procreators who do not intend to rear
and their duties qua procreators and (future) childrearers may be useful in dissolving the debate
by doing justice to the truth in each side.
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is harmed by being locked into an authoritative relationship with a person
who has defaulted on some prima facie duty or virtue attached to the parental
role. If it is objectionable for a procreator qua future childrearer to engage in
genetic shaping, then the wrong can be rectified only by allowing somebody
else to rear the respective child.
Therefore, when the parental genetic shaping takes the form of selection,
the possible complaint against it—as I shall argue—is that it creates an ob-
jectionable relationship and it is not aimed at the parent qua mere procreator.
As already explained, qua mere procreator the selecting parent merely creates
a child who cannot be harmed by selection. However, qua future childrearer,
the parent who decides to select can do something objectionable by creating
an objectionable relationship. The creation of an objectionable relationship,
as I argue in Section IV, would not happen if, by chance, the same embryo
was implanted in the absence of a parental decision to choose it based on
particular genetic features. Nor would it happen if an individual other than
the procreator were to become the childrearer of that particular child.
When the parental genetic shaping takes the form of enhancement, the
possible complaint against it is more straightforward and it is also brought
against the procreator qua future childrearer. The complaint concerns both
the creation of an objectionable relationship and possible harm to the future
child. This is because the child who develops from the enhanced embryo may
be worse off than she or he would have otherwise been by dint of being subject
to an objectionable relationship with her or his parent. Indeed, some of the
arguments against selection and enhancement have pointed to the connection
between parental genetic shaping and the parent–child relationship (Clayton
2006; Habermas 2003; Malmqvist 2011).
III. IS PARENTAL GENETIC SHAPING NORMATIVELY
DIFFERENT FROM PARENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL SHAPING?
This section looks at the most persuasive lines of criticism against parental
genetic shaping in order to determine whether or not they apply with the
same force against parental environmental shaping.
Good parents wish their children well, and take steps to ensure that their
children do in fact fare well. Formulated in such a general way, the statement
seems uncontroversial. But there is no consensus about the level of well-being
that one’s child must reach before parents stop having duties of beneficence
towards their children or, indeed, a permission to benefit their children. It is
disputed whether parents have a duty to maximize their children’s well-being
and whether parents have a permission to invest resources in advancing their
childrenwell-being beyondwhat justice requires them to have. Julian Savulescu
has defended a principle, which has become influential in discussions about








procreative decision making: the principle of Procreative Beneficence. It states
that ‘couples (or single reproducers) should select the child, of the possible
children they could have, who is expected to have the best life, or at least
as good a life as the others, based on the relevant, available information’
(Savulescu 2001: 415). Presumably, the principle applies not only to selection
proper, but also to determining, via enhancement, some of the features of the
future child.
Several lines of criticism can be levelled against the principle of Procreative
Beneficence. Some of them are independent from parental motivation and
have to do exclusively with the welfare of the future child. Jonathan Wolff
pointed to the following worry (which he doesn’t endorse): people in general
may be poor judges of what features are truly beneficial for their children (Wolff
unpublished). He invokes the distopian vision of a TV show called ‘Stepford
Children’, where robots replaced real children. They ‘were polite, obedient,
hard-working, truth-telling, intelligent, good at sports, and energetic, with no
time for television or junk food. They were also deeply dull’ (Wolff unpub-
lished). If procreators really had a tendency to misjudge what characteristics
would be beneficial for their offspring, this would be a reason to reject genetic
shaping as well as environmental shaping for medically and morally neutral
features.
But most philosophers who found parental genetic shaping objectionable
have focused on the reasons for which future parents may want to use genetic
technology to choose their future children.Medically unnecessary andmorally
neutral enhancementsmay be undertaken by future parents for several reasons.
Some enhancements may be sought, and some embryos may be chosen,
because parents want their children to have competitive advantage over other
children. The conferral of competitive advantage entails that, by dint of mak-
ing one’s child better off, one also makes other people’s children worse off
(Brighouse and Swift 2006); therefore, it raises a strong distributive objection
which is independent from the shape of the parent–child relationship and
which applies equally to parental genetic and environmental shaping.
Genetic shaping aimed at competitive advantage can also be criticized be-
cause it expresses objectionable parental attitudes, rather than aims. Parental
genetic shaping can express the expectation that the child will engage, vol-
untarily or not, in competitive situations and that she or he ought to succeed
in these competitions. In the most benign form, this expectation may be a
mere realistic prediction that the child will not be able to avoid competitions,
combined with a hope that she will not (always) lose out in social competitions.
When genetic shaping is likely to be necessary for the child’s life to go no
worse than others’, the parental desire to confer competitive advantage does
not seem objectionable. But in the case of enhancements—or grounds for
selection—that we consider here, and which are medically unmotivated, it is
more likely that the parental attitude expressed goes beyond the permissible
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desire that one’s child fares no worse than others. The parental attitude is
therefore likely to involve a burden of expectation—that the child succeeds
in social competitions—which is unfair to the child and out of line with the
theory of ideal parental attitudes recently defended by several philosophers.
Some philosophers are concerned with how easy it is to misuse parental power,
given the particularities of the parent–child relationship in which children are
asymmetrically situated and unusually vulnerable to their parents and, at the
same time, incapable to afford to exit the parent–child relationship (Brighouse
and Swift 2014; Clayton 2006). Fox (2008) and others (Wolff unpublished) ar-
gued that good parents exhibit, as a parental virtue, moderation in how much
control they try to exert over their children and I have argued for an ideal of
parental love in light of which selection and enhancement look objectionable
(Gheaus 2014). In short, the expectation that a person will be more competitive
than others may be an attitude fit for a coach whose services one has requested
oneself; but not, in this view, for a parent. This argument, if correct, will cut
against parental attempts to confer competitive advantage by either genetic or
environmental shaping—as both Fox (2008) and Clayton (2006) acknowledge.
Then, some parental genetic shaping may be undertaken in order to confer
non-competitive advantage to the future child. Presumably, some parents wish
to make use of existing technologies to make their children better off without
thereby making anyone else worse off. But, to the extent to which the features
chosen by parents expresses a particular vision of the good life, genetic shap-
ing for non-competitive advantage remains open to the charges of failing to
respect the child’s future autonomy and of being unduly psychologically bur-
dening. The conferral of non-competitive advantage looks more acceptable on
traditional egalitarian grounds than the conferral of competitive advantage,
but faces the objection of undue use of parental power. Clayton, in particular,
stressed that children’s future autonomy is violated by parental behaviours
that stir the children’s lives towards particular (morally non-required) life goals
(2006: 104–5). In this view, an adult looking back at her parents’ attempts to
instil certain traits or values in her has reason to complain that, as a child,
she had once been enrolled in a conception of the good life that she is now
rejecting. Moreover, children whose parents try to intentionally stir them to-
wards particular goals are likely to face unwarranted psychological costs in
reassessing their commitment to the goals in question (Clayton 2006: 106–7).
Just as above, the cases against parental environmental and parental genetic
shaping appear symmetric.
Finally, parents may want to use genetic shaping in order to express, via
the child, some of their dearest values and commitments or to extend them-
selves through their children. Several philosophers believe that parents have
a prerogative to shape children as an act of self-extension, in order to per-
petuate their own (parental) values and commitments, or in order to accom-
plish a unique sort of creative act, or for both aims. In this view, parental








shaping—whether for the sake of passing on values and commitments or for
the sake of creation—contributes essentially to the value of parenting.Macleod,
for instance, writes that:
The recognition that valued features of one’s own sense of self have been extended to
one’s children and form part of their sense of self can be a profound sense of satisfaction.
We can see ourselves carried forward in another self we played a significant role in
creating. (2010, 142)
Just like the conferral of advantage, parental self-extension is open to the
above criticism: attempts to perpetuate one’s values, or some of one’s features,
through one’s children are clear cases of attempting to enrol children in one’s
idea of a good life. They are incompatible with the demanding ideal of parental
neutrality endorsed by Clayton.
Yet, one need not endorse Clayton’s extremely restrictive view in order to be
critical of self-extension. Brighouse and Swift (2014) objected that parental self-
extension amounts to using one’s child as a means to one’s ends. Moreover, the
value of self-extension through parenting is exaggerated as long as individuals
have otherways of perpetuating their values and commitments and of engaging
in significant creative acts. Indeed, it seems that childrearers always have access
to the latter, since any successful childrearing is a highly creative act even in the
absence of any intentional parental shaping (Brighouse and Swift 2014: 101–4).
Another possible line of objection to self-extension comes from a plausible
ideal of love in general and, in particular, from an ideal of love—understood as
affectionate care—for one’s children.9 Children need care and affection from
the people who raise them, and continuity in the relationship with their rearers.
For liberal egalitarians, this generally undisputed fact serves as themain ground
for justifying the existence of the family in the first place (Brighouse and Swift
2014). But one may wonder whether love in general is compatible with seeing
the beloved, or the relationship with the beloved, as a project of, for instance,
self-expression. In particular, Brighouse and Swift (2014) argued that parental
love has unique value in virtue of the child’s unconditional and spontaneous
affection towards and trust in her parents. Adults may be unable to match
children’s affection on these counts. Yet, if mutuality in loving relationships
is desirable, and if spontaneity contributes to the value of love, adults should
not limit, for self-serving reasons, their own ability to experience spontaneity
in relationship with their children. There seems to be some tension between
the aim of parental self-expression through shaping the child and the aim of
making room for certain forms of spontaneity in the relationship: for instance,
for spontaneous appreciation of one’s (future) child. The more procreators
exercise their power to determine who the future child will be, the less they
9 I attempt to do some of this in Gheaus (2014), where I argue that parental love for a child is
not supposed to be conditional on morally neutral characteristics of the child.
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will have to discover about the individuality of the child—and, thereby, the
more they will restrict how much spontaneous delight they can take in such
discovery. Of course, parental self-expression need not involve a complete
scripting of the parent–child relationship, but it does go into the direction of
scripting and it can, for this reason, be objectionable. Again, if the objection
holds, it applies to both genetic and environmental parental shaping.
IV. AN UNNECESSARY INEQUALITY
The objections to parental shaping explored above apply in similar ways to
environmental and genetic shaping. They do not give any reason to doubt
Agar’s principle that both genetic and environmental shaping are on a par.
Yet, genetic shaping may be more objectionable than environmental shaping
in a way that I explain in this section.
When procreators engage in the genetic shaping of children they intend
to rear—that is, when they shape qua procreators-and-future childrearers—
they exercise some choice with respect to who one’s future child will be.
Many critics of enhancement and selection find the exercise of such choice
intuitively objectionable, yet it is not easy to explain what exactly makes it so
without raising the question of whether similar worries apply to, for instance,
parental educational choices. Opponents of genetic shaping sometimes appeal
to the ideal of unconditional parental love to criticize the act of choosing
one’s children: this consideration is central to the concerns expressed by The
Presidents’ Council of Bioethics (2003: 54–5).10 Yet, as Wolff (unpublished)
noted, this line of criticism is unconvincing since parents who engage in genetic
shaping can, and often do, love their children even in cases when their attempts
to control the future child’s features prove unsuccessful. This response seems
both apt and unlikely to fully dispel the worry that procreators’ choices in
some way corrupt the relationship between parent and child.
Behind the intuition that choosing one’s children is incompatible with un-
conditional love may lay the belief that love can only be unconditional if the
attachment to the beloved occurs independently of that object’s character-
istics.11 This, however, is not obvious. In her response to Michael Sandel’s
criticism of genetic shaping, Kamm notes that particular characteristics are in
10 Which reads: ‘The attitude of parents toward their child may be quietly shifted from
unconditional acceptance to critical scrutiny: the very first act of parenting now becomes not
the unreserved welcoming of an arriving child, but the judging of his or her fitness, while still an
embryo, to become their child, all by the standards of con- temporary genetic screening’.
11 It is in itself an interesting question whether parental love ought to be unconditional. I
engage with this in Gheaus (2014), noting that parental love may be conditional on certain moral
features of the child.








fact an appropriate basis for choosing those to whom we become emotionally
attached:
Before we love someone, we may be interested in meeting a person who has various
properties, such as kindness, intelligence, artistic ability . . . etc. When we meet such
a person we may be interested in him rather than someone else because he has these
properties. However . . . it is the particular person that we wind up loving, not their set
of properties. For if another person appears with the same set of properties, that does
not mean that we could . . . substitute him for the person we already love. Even if the
person we love loses some of the properties through which we were originally led to love
him (e.g. his beauty) and another person has more of the good properties that originally
interested us, we would not necessarily stop loving the particular person we love . . .
[B]efore a particular person exists whom we love (just as before we find someone to
love), it is permissible to think more boldly in terms of the characteristics we would like
to have in a person and that we think it is best for a person to have. (2005)
Kamm thinks that loving one’s child is analogous to loving a partner with
respect to the permissibility of choosing the object of one’s love. If she is
right, all that is morally required for someone to qualify as a loving parent
is that (a) once the child exists, she or he be non-fungible to the parent and
(b) that parental love survives the loss of some of the child’s features that
may have triggered the love in the first place. I do not dispute here Kamm’s
claims about the nature of love, or the belief that a parent who fulfils (a) and (b)
simultaneously is a loving parent.12 My interest is instead in how the conditions
in which the forming of a loving parent–child relationships can impact on its
moral quality.
Kamm’s analysis may be more or less persuasive when applied to the
formation of loving relationships between adults. Yet, relationships between
children and adults are structurally different from relationships between adults
in an important way. The difference between the two types of relationships
is that relationships between adults are mutually voluntary: adults can choose
whether or not to enter a relationship with each other and both adults in a
relationship have an exit choice. The relationship between parent and child
lacks these features. The relationship is not voluntarily entered on the side of
child, and it is only in part voluntary entered on the side of the procreating
parent. As noted in the beginning of the paper, procreators can choose whether
or not to procreate-and-parent but traditionally they hadno choicewith respect
to the characteristics of their future children. It is also a ‘no exit’ relationship
12 But others do. Fox, who also relies on this long citation from Kamm as a foil to help him
criticize genetic shaping think s that ‘it is intelligible for a parent to express love for her future
offspring even before a particular child, with her particular qualities, comes into being ... This is
a love that properly takes hold before parents learn anything about the sort of person the child
is or will become. It is fitting for parents to embark on love for a child in a manner that is not
contingent on the particular characteristics about her that we value’. (2008: 258).
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for the (minor) child, for whom the costs of exiting are too high.13 That exit
costs are so high for children also puts very strict limits on the conditions in
which parents ought to be permitted to exit the relationship. Adults have some
limited exit possibilities: a procreative parent may put a child up for adoption
at birth and, more difficultly, later on (and, in fact, some parents abandon their
children with impunity, especially after separation from another parent). So,
unlike loving relationships between adults, the parent–child relationship is:
(1) a lot less voluntary at both entry and exit for both parties
and
(2) displays a deep asymmetry of voluntary entry and exit between the two
parties.
Here I contend that the first feature of the parent–child relationship—its
non-voluntariness with respect to who is one’s child or parent—has moral
value because it mitigates, to some degree, the child’s complete lack of choice
concerning both entrance into and exit from the relationshipwith their parents.
Selection or enhancement threatens the symmetry that exists in this respect in
the relationship between child and parent.
Consider the following analogy, meant to tease out intuitions concerning
what would be morally problematic about undermining this symmetry: think
of a community that practices the (illiberal) custom of arranged marriage. This
custom can take one of the two forms:
(i) The marriage is fully arranged by the spouse’s parents and neither bride
nor groom has any say with respect to whom they will marry. Only men
have a say on whether to marry.
Or
(ii) The marriage is largely arranged by the spouse’s parents and neither bride
nor groom can decide whom they will marry, yet there are two differences
between bride and groom: only men have a say on whether or not to marry
and, if they decide to marry, they can have a say between a few numbers of
partners pre-selected for them by their parents, on the basis of their known
characteristics. The women have neither choice.
I contend that the first case is preferable to the second in at least one respect: it
honours, to a larger extent, spouses’ moral equality to each other. Therefore,
the relationship between future spouses embodies, other things equal, more
equality in the first kind of case than in the second. This imaginary case is
not meant as a perfect analogy with the case of parents and children and
13 Sometimes social services take children away from parents; this gives children some exit
power only if they can trigger the process in a reasonably reliable way. Also, children sometimes
have a say concerning (partial) exit from the relationship with one parent when parents separate.
I am grateful to anonymous referee for these qualifications.








it holds better in the case of embryo selection rather than in the case of
enhancement—when the object of parental choice is a number of features of
the future child. The analogy is merely intended to highlight the prima facie
moral importance that individuals who are equal have the same level of choice
when they enter an intimate relationship with each other. In an ideal intimate
relationship, nobody has more freedom to choose one’s partner—whether the
choice regards who the partner will be or (merely) some of their features.14
Now, when it comes to parents and children, most people do not think that
the lack of equality between them with respect to entering and exiting their re-
lationship is objectionable—at least not all things considered. But inequalities
between parents and children are legitimate only as long as they are unavoid-
able, or avoidable only at very high moral costs, or necessary for satisfying
children’s rights and other important interests. Concerning inequalities at en-
try, it is unavoidable that children come into the world—and hence into the
relationship with their parents—involuntarily. Andwhile it is possible for adults
to relinquish their freedom concerning whether to become parents, making
parenthood non-voluntary is likely to involve an enormous loss of well-being
for parents and for their children.15 Many inequalities in the relationship be-
tween parents and children are necessary to protect children’s most important
interests—including their rights. In these cases, it is easy to see why they are all
things considered justified. For instance, inequalities at exit between parents
and children are permissible to the extent to which children need parents to
ensure that their most important interests are respected. Similarly, children’s
lack of full autonomy legitimates much asymmetrical power of parents over
them; it is legitimate that parents decide on children’s diets and not the other
way around; for the same reason, genetic shaping aimed at preventing disease
or disability does not come under the purview of my criticism.
But introducing additional, easily avoidable, inequalities seems, at least
prima facie, objectionable on grounds of fairness as long as they do not serve
any of these purposes. The objectionable unfairness regards the distribution
of power between parent and children. The ideal that guides this objection
is one of relationships not displaying easily avoidable inequalities that are
not necessary to protect the most important interests of the more vulnerable,
dependent party, that is, of the child. It seems possible to recast the objection in
the republican language of domination: genetic shaping that takes the form of
enhancement allows the parent to choose the child’s features, thus making the
child dependent on her parent’s will in yet another way. In the case of genetic
14 For further elaboration on this analogy, and on the argument of this section, see Gheaus
(2016).
15 Although note that in a world of non-voluntary parenting most likely different people
would be born than in a world of voluntary parenting. This means that the real reasons for
upholding voluntariness with respect to whether and when one becomes a parent concerns
parents’ well-being and autonomy and impersonal goodness.
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shaping that takes the form of selection, the republican objection applies in
a less straightforward way; a decision to select creates a more dependent
relationship than would have existed in the absence of selection. Note that
the relationship might, but need not, be with the same individual child that
would have otherwise existed, in the case in which the same selected embryo
would had been conceived and carried to term by non-selecting procreators.
And the dependency in question could be avoided if another individual than
the person who decided to select was to raise the child (assuming this other
prospective parent did not choose the child based on any knowledge of the
child’s features.)
This is not to say that there cannot be any moral appeal to allowing some
choice to at least one party, both in the case of spouses-to-be and in the case of
parenting. Consequentialists interested in maximizing autonomous acts may
welcome that at least the groom, if not the bride and at least the parent, if
not the child, comes closer to making their own decision. Further, for utili-
tarians it will be relevant that the second kind of marriage may stand better
chances to happiness (if the groom is wise). Utilitarians will then have to fac-
tor in the likelihood that the bride’s resentment at being treated as less than
equal to her groom will poison marital bliss. Just like in the case of spouses,
parents who choose their future children on the basis of some characteristics
may stand a better chance to family happiness—either because they have
their wishes met or because they may be better able enjoy relationships with
children who display certain features than with other children. This, in turn,
would benefit both parents and children. Again, these considerations will have
to be balanced against the possibility that children of design may doubt the
grounds of their parents’ love, whether or not for philosophically sound rea-
sons. In addition, to those interested in maximizing utility it will clearly be rel-
evant that parental genetic shaping may result in an increase in well-being for
the child.
An all-things-considered evaluation of parental genetic shaping will require
commitment to a particular position in normative ethics and, possibly, suffi-
cient empirical information to decide whether genetic shaping will result in a
net gain in well-being.Whatever that final evaluation, enhancement and selec-
tion introduce an additional, avoidable inequality to the already very unequal
parent–child relationship. This inequality is, by assumption, not necessary for
the normal functioning of the child. A parent’s decision to love an unchosen
child contributes towards a parent–child relationship that is as equal as possible
without jeopardizing the child’s well-being and future autonomy.
The moral importance of maximizing equality at the beginning of the
parent–child relationship distinguishes genetic shaping for morally and medi-
cally irrelevant features from environmental shaping. For example, one could
reject the anti-perfectionistic ideal of childrearing defended by Clayton and
think that it is permissible to engage in some environmental shaping of one’s








child for the sake of conferring advantages. So, one may think that there is
nothing wrong with encouraging medically and morally neutral features in
one’s child that are meant to make her life better, at least as long as these
will not result in competitive advantage and are not cultivated for the sake
of parental self-extension. Take, for instance, the case of a humourless parent
who is cultivating her child’s sense of humour in order to make the life of the
child (non-competitively) better. Is this behaviour open to the same objection
of unnecessarily increasing the inequality in an already very unequal relation-
ship? It seems not. It is true that this parent, by shaping her child, is partly
determining who is the person whom she is going to continue to raise. But the
decision takes place within a relationship that is already as equal as it can be
with respect to voluntary entry and exit for both parties.
Whatever normative importance you may attach to equality between par-
ties at the point of entry in relationships in general, there is a reason to think
that this kind of equality is especially important within the parent–child re-
lationship. In relationships between two or more adults, or between two or
more children, parties are usually equally able to shape each other within the
relationship. In contrast, children have less power to shape their parents than
parents have power to shape their children.Once the parent–child relationship
exists, children do exert some influences on their parents. This influence is at
first unintentional and therefore entirely uncontrolled by the child and then,
gradually, increasingly intentional. Over time, a child partly determines who is
the person who is parenting them, and part of this shaping can be intentional.
After the parent–child relationship has been established, both participants to
it inevitably shape the other’s features—slowly but continuously. But, absent
special circumstances, the power of the child to shape her parents remains
inferior to the power of the parent to shape the child. This fact may bear on
the special importance of equality at entry in relationships between parents
and children and hence on the reason why parental genetic shaping is ob-
jectionable. Shaping the child before the relationship exists exacerbates the
already existing overall inequality of ‘voice’ in parent–child relationship:
The exacerbation of inequality at the entry point into the relationship is
more problematic than the one introduced by parental environmental shap-
ing of morally neutral and medically unnecessary features—features which,
by assumption, are not necessary for protecting the child’s rights. Attempts
to environmental shaping also exacerbate the inequality between parents and
children, but at least they are likely to be met with an expression of chil-
dren’s approval, or disapproval, of the attempted shaping. Malmqvist (2011)
has argued that environmental shaping unfolds over time in the context of
the parent–child relationship and this makes it easier for the parent to assess
its impact on the child’s well-being. That children have at least a chance to
be heard makes environmental shaping less problematic than genetic shap-
ing. Even more importantly, unlike genetic shaping, environmental shaping
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happens in a context in which the child can already—albeit to a lesser extent
than the parent—shape the other individual in the relationship. Genetic shap-
ing allows parents to influence children even before children have any power to
shape parents—either intentionally or unintentionally—and to react to their
attempts at shaping. It introduces, in the history of the relationship, a phase
when the child had no possibility to shape the parent either intentionally or
unintentionally. Whereas the parent had such a chance and used it.
Therefore, for reasons of equality, and other things equal, parental genetic
shaping is more objectionable than parental environmental shaping.
V. CONCLUSIONS
I have argued for two claims in this paper: first, that genetic shaping is morally
objectionable because it exacerbates the asymmetry between parent and child
with respect to the voluntariness of their entrance into the parent–child rela-
tionship. Secondly, that parental genetic shaping is, for this reason, different
and more objectionable than parental environmental shaping; but I did not
attempt to say anything about how (much more) objectionable. As far as the
present argument shows, genetic shaping is objectionable when undertaken
by a procreator qua future childrearer; my account says nothing about the
normative status of genetic shaping undertaken by mere procreators.
Depending on the weight one attaches to avoidingmorally unjustified asym-
metries between parents and children with respect to their voluntary partic-
ipation in the parent–child relationship, one will see the argument against
environmental shaping that I present as more or less decisive. In particular,
one may think that the value of equality between parents and children must be
balanced against the gains in child’s well-being that may result from genetic
enhancement. As I note in the previous section, the case for gains in well-being
is an ambiguous ground for evaluating parental genetic enhancement: on the
one hand, parental environmental shaping may be used to confer advantage
on children and improve the prospects of the future relationship between par-
ent and child. On the other hand, children may resent their status as ‘designer
babies’ and feel less securely attached; in the latter case, the relationship with
their parent may be detrimentally affected as well.
If the argument of this paper is correct, it has some implications for inten-
tionally shaping one’s future child by ways other than genetic technology—for
instance, by choosing one’s procreative partner based on looks or intelligence
in the hope that these features will be passed on to their child. The argument
also bears on the ethics of adoption, telling something against permitting
prospective adopting parents to choose the child they adopt based on that
child’s features.








Finally, for those who already believe that all parental shaping of morally
neutral and medically unnecessary features is illegitimate, the argument I
offer in this paper provides a pro tanto reason for radical changes in the allo-
cation of the right to parent in some cases. Assume that, like Clayton, one
thinks that all avoidable enrollment of a child in the parent’s conception of
the good is impermissible. One may still support some genetic—as well as
environmental—shaping as a source of benefits for the future child, if the
choice to shape does not belong to the parent. If it is undisputed that a partic-
ular feature, the likelihood of which can be genetically controlled, will benefit a
child, then there is a good case that the child should get the genetic treatment.
For instance, it may be clearly better for a child to have a genetic set-up that
precludes teeth decay. But in this case the genetic treatment should, in the
interest of fairness, be thought of as a matter of general, state regulated policy
and equally available to all children. If, by contrast, it is controversial that a
particular genetic treatment will advance the child’s well-being, then parents
overstep their prerogatives by genetically (or environmentally) shaping their
children. If a procreator who intends to rear the child nevertheless does engage
in genetic shaping, the argument of this paper provides a pro tanto reason to
allow another willing individual to rear the child in question. And, in a society
in which people routinely engage in genetic shaping, it provides a pro tanto
reason to shuffle babies amongst various prospective parents.16
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